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The Power of Pregnancy:
Examining Constitutional Rights in a
Gestational Surrogacy Contract
by ALAYNA OHS*
The process of pregnancy and childbirth often follows a "typical"
course, based on natural biological functions.
But in our
technological age, such functions no longer need to be relied on.
Women who do not wish to physically give birth or are unable to do
so can have an embryo implanted in another woman (a "surrogate")
who can gestate and give birth to the child. This process is called
"surrogacy." There are two types of surrogacy. When the woman
carrying the fetus is the genetic mother, the process is called
"traditional surrogacy." When the woman is not the genetic mother
of the fetus-often because it is the genetic product of the couple that
initiated the implantation process (the "intended parents")-the
process is called "gestational surrogacy."

While surrogacy allows numerous individuals and couples to
parent children in situations that might not otherwise be possible,
these developments have caused scholars and courts substantial
concern. Surrogacy law is an area unresolved in many places. Some

* J.D. candidate May 2002, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
would like to thank Professor Lois Weithorn and Jennifer Fabish for their knowledge,
patience, and assistance.
1. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1932 (1987) (addressing concerns of commodification of women and children in surrogacy
arrangements); Mary Lynne Birck, Modern Reproductive Technology and Motherhood:
The Search for Common Ground and the Recognition of Difference, 62 U. CIN. L. REV.
1623, 1648 (1994) (arguing that the experience of pregnancy makes gestation unique and
different from artificial insemination cases); In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 421-22 (1988)
(holding that surrogacy arrangements are void as against public policy); Kass v. Kass, 91
N.Y.2d 554, 561-62 (1998) (holding that when a couple divorces, they are bound to the
terms of a contract in determining the disposition of pre-zygotes frozen for in vitro
fertilization).
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states have banned it;2 other states have strictly regulated it.'
This Note will examine the gestational surrogacy process and its
relationship to the contracting parties' rights. Specifically, this Note
proposes that reproductive technologies require recognizing the
Constitutional rights of a gestator as distinct from those of a
"mother." The concept of motherhood is often reworked when
dealing with reproductive technologies, in order to recognize the
distinction between the woman who gestates a fetus and the woman
who intends to raise the child. Likewise, the rights associated with
pregnancy and parenting should also be divided this way. Failure to
do this shifts the boundaries of appropriate behavior, causing
intended parents to have flawed beliefs about their rights to exercise
control over the gestational surrogates with whom they contract.
Although many issues that arise in gestational surrogacy also
apply to traditional surrogacy arrangements, gestational surrogacy is
unique because the fetus is genetically unrelated to the surrogate, and
thus it may be easier to separate "motherhood" from gestation. On
the other hand, it may be more difficult in the traditional surrogacy
arrangement, when the gestator is the genetic mother. The most
prominent example of this is the famous Baby M. case, where a New
Jersey court invalidated a traditional surrogacy arrangement as a
baby-selling contract.4
Where courts or legislatures have allowed gestational surrogacy
contracts, however, surrogates have often been seen as providers of a
"service," rather than baby-sellers. As such, the individual rights
closely associated with pregnancy-and implicitly in our society,
"mothers"-such as the right to an abortion or the right to make
medical decisions about one's own body, are not usually
acknowledged as the explicit rights of a gestator specifically. So while
we do not usually question a mother's right to make decisions about
her medical care, the rule is blurred when the mother is a contracting

2. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-218 (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2713 (West
2000) (prohibiting surrogacy contracts for consideration) MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.248
(159) (Michie 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE §14-18-05 (2000); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 122 (Consol.
2000).
3. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 126.045 (Michie 2000) (Parentage of the child
must be stated in the contract and compensation is prohibited for other than "medical and
necessary living expenses related to the birth of the child."); WASH. REV. CODE §§
25.25.210-26.26.260 (2001) (disallowing surrogacy arrangements for compensation or in
situations where the surrogate is mentally retarded, has a mental illness or developmental
disability, or is a minor).
4. See In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396 (1988).
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party who only observes the process of gestation, rather than being an
active participant in it.
This recognition of the role of the gestator, as separate from that
of the intended mother, is necessary in our society and should be
explicitly acknowledged in the gestational surrogacy arrangement.
To understand this concept, I suggest that gestational surrogacy
arrangements should be conceptualized as a process with three
phases: the creation of procreative intent that occurs when intended
parents contract for a surrogate's services, the decision-making phase
of gestation, and parenthood. These phases give rise to different
concerns: the first phase necessitates consideration of contract
formation and rights, the second phase requires reflection on bodily
integrity and property rights, and the final phase merits consideration
of parental rights. I propose that this three-part framework helps
delineate the relevant legal principles that apply at each phase, rather
than taking a more aggregated view that allows courts to reach their
desired results without giving full weight to the rights of the
gestational surrogate-for example, by justifying the intended
parents' right to control a gestational surrogate's medical decisions
about the fetus because they are the parents of the resulting child.
Thus, this Note will focus on the crucial second phase of the
gestational surrogacy arrangement, which is often undervalued or
ignored in discussions about how to treat surrogacy contracts and
violation of those contracts. Part I will give a brief summary of the
current state of surrogacy law in the nation, paying particular
attention to California, which is considered a "favorable legal forum"
for surrogacy contracts It will then examine the Florida statute on
surrogacy and the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act, both of which provide statutory models for states seeking to
regulate surrogacy.6 Part II will address the surrogate's rights,
including rights to medical care and procreation. Part III will address
contract and property rights that become relevant when the contract
is breached. Finally, Part IV will address post-birth rights, focusing
on parental rights, which sometimes affect the perceived degree of
control intended parents are entitled to during gestation.
This Note then proposes that gestational surrogacy arrangements
must be carefully and thoroughly addressed by state legislatures in
order to ensure the rights of all parties are fully understood and
5.

Thomas M. Pinkerton, Esq., Surrogacy and Egg Donation Law in California, at

http://www.surrogacy.com/legals/article/calaw.htm.
6. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2000); 9B U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1994).
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respected.
Failure to legislate not only risks compromising
constitutional protections, usually for surrogates rather than intended
parents, but also creates unnecessary instability for children born
from gestational surrogacy arrangements. Therefore, legislators
should help parties have realistic expectations that will help prevent
or expedite litigation.
I. Surrogacy Law in the United States
Many states have dealt with surrogacy directly.7 However, many
other states remain devoid of statutory guidelines. Even if statutes
were to declare surrogacy contracts void, as is the case in many states,
at least clearly defined principles would allow individuals to know
what to expect in surrogacy contracts, informing their decisions about
the possible risks and benefits of entering such arrangements. As
Lori Andrews has recognized:
Currently, the biggest risk to children in the surrogacy context
comes not from the actions of either set of parents but from the
uncertain status of the law, which.., can lead to the child being
subjected to years of litigation to determine who will be
considered to be his or her legal parents.8
Thus legislation is needed not only for the benefit of the
contracting parties, but also for the child that is born as a result of the
contract.
A. Legislative Silence: The Failure of Unregulated Surrogacy
Arrangements in California

California is one state without legislation in the arena of
surrogacy law. California's silence has been particularly poignant
because of a 1993 case that allowed enforcement of a surrogacy
contract under a liberal "intent-based" analysis that favors couples
contracting for the services of a surrogate. 9 The intent-based analysis
determines that the parties with intent to parent at the formation of
the contract-the "intended parents"-are the parents under
California law. 1"

While the intent test created a resolution in the

Johnson case, subsequent cases suggest that further guidance is
needed to interpret other possible variations on surrogacy
7. See supra notes 2-3.
8. Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for
Surrogate Motherhood,81 VA. L. REV. 2343,2358 (1995).
9. Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 93 (1993).
10. Id.
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arrangements, because it is evident that questions about surrogacy
remain, despite the guidance offered in Johnson."
In January 1990, Mark and Crispina Calvert sought a gestational
surrogate to carry a fetus of their genetic makeup. Hearing about
their situation from a co-worker, Anna Johnson volunteered to act as
a gestational surrogate for the couple in exchange for an insurance
policy and several monetary payments. 3 In return, Johnson agreed to
relinquish her parental rights. 4
Within a month of implantation, Johnson was pregnant.
However, relations between the Calverts and Johnson deteriorated
when Mr. Calvert discovered Johnson had previously suffered several
stillbirths and miscarriages. 6 Johnson felt the Calverts had not done
enough to obtain the insurance policy, and felt abandoned during an
onset of premature labor in June. 7 Distressed at what she perceived

as their lack of concern together with her inability to work, she
worried that she and her daughter were going to be evicted, and sent
the Calverts a distraught letter. 8 In it, she threatened that she would
not give them the child unless they "helped her out.""

In response, the Calverts filed a lawsuit, seeking a declaration
that they were the parents of the child. Neither party disputed that
11. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (1998); In re Marriage of
Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218 (1994).
12. Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th. at 87. Crispina Calvert was unable to carry a child because of
a previous medical problem that had resulted in a hysterectomy. However, she was still
able to produce eggs. Id.
13. Id. Ms. Johnson was to receive $10,000 in a series of installments and a $200,000
insurance policy on her own life. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 87-88.
18. Anna J. v. Mark C., 12 Cal. App. 4th 977, 984 (1991) (opinion below).
19. Id. In her letter, Johnson explained, "[D]ue to the complications of this
pregnancy, I am unable to return to work until the delivery of this baby so my income is
limited ....I don't think you'd want your child jeopardized by living out on the street. I
have looked out for this child's well being thus far, is it asking too much to look after ours?
... "[Y]ou have not been very supportive mentally the entire pregnancy & you've showed
a lack of interest unless it came to an ultrasound. I am asking you for help ....But see,
this situation can go two ways. One, you can pay me the entire sum early so I won't have
to live in the streets, or two you can forget about helping me but, calling it a breach of
contract & not get the baby! I don't want it to get this nasty, not coming this far, but you'd
want some help too, if you had no where to go & have to worry about not only yourself
but your own child & the child of someone else!!!" Id.
20. Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 88.
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Mark Calvert was the child's genetic father.2 Ensuing litigation
determined that both Crispina Calvert, because she was the genetic
mother, and Anna Johnson, as the woman who gave birth to the
child, met the California statutory definition of "natural mother."22
In "breaking the tie" of motherhood, the court applied the
Uniform Parentage Act, which was not designed to deal with
surrogacy arrangements, but was created to eliminate the legal
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children.23
In
situations where the gestator (Anna Johnson) and the genetic
contributor (Crispina Calvert) both met the statutory definition of
"mother," the California Supreme Court reasoned, "[S]he who
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise
as her own-is the natural mother under California law." 4 As a
result, the court held Crispina Calvert as the mother of the child.25
The contract previously characterized as one to terminate Anna
Johnson's parental rights was re-characterized by the court as a
contract for "services." 26

In its decision, the court emphasized the Calverts' procreative
right to have a child and their parental right to the companionship of
that child.27 Because Anna Johnson was not the "natural mother" of
21. Id.
22. Id. at 112. The court further reasoned that the legislation contemplated that a
child would only have one "natural mother." Id.
23. Id. at 88.
24. Id. at 93.
25. Id. at 99.
26. Id. at 96. While the facts of the case indicate that Anna Johnson was giving up her
parental rights in the contract, in its decision the court noted, "The payments to Anna
under the contract were meant to compensate her for her services in gestating the fetus
and undergoing labor, rather than for giving up 'parental' rights to the child." Id. at 96.
27. Id. at 100. The lower court was even more explicit in establishing the Calverts'
parental rights. See id. at 95 ("To hold that Anna has a liberty interest in the relationship
with the child is to diminish the liberty interest of Mark and Crispina in their relationship
with the child. Given that Mark and Crispina are the "natural parents," due process can
hardly be used to deprive them of the traditional parental relationship which they might
otherwise be able to enjoy."). The right to raise one's child is grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process clause and has been expounded upon by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees the right to "establish a home and bring up children."); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that a law which requires children to attend
public school "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that the parental right to children one has "sired and
raised ... undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.").
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the child, her constitutional rights were not implicated. 8 Thus, Anna
Johnson had no procreative or parental rights. The matter seemed
logically settled.
However, the problematic nature of the Johnson court's holding
can be seen if other possibilities are contemplated. Consider the two
alternatives below:
Anna Johnson faces the same situation: her relationship with the
Calverts has deteriorated, and she is resentful that she must care not
only for her own child, but another couple's. 29 Unable to work and
concerned about her own child, Johnson informs the Calverts that she
is going to have an abortion."

Anna Johnson undergoes testing that reveals that the fetus is
physically or mentally impaired.' Hearing this, the Calverts order
Anna to have an abortion or take responsibility for the child that will
be born-they no longer wish to "parent."
The Johnson Court addressed the immediate situation before

them, and suggested that further legislative guidance was needed.32
As the Johnson court seemed to recognize, parties continue to remain
"in the dark" about their general rights and duties, and questions like

those addressed above remain unanswered. The Court's decision in
Johnson did not answer these questions about the general structure
and validity of surrogacy contracts during performance, and the
California legislature's subsequent failure to address the issue means
courts that apply Johnson in gestational surrogacy arrangements face

28. See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 99.
29. Anna J. v. Mark C., 12 Cal. App. 4th 977, 984 (1991) (opinion below).
30. The appellate court that reviewed the Johnson case asked a similar question, but
they chose not to answer it as being an issue better left to the legislature. See id. at 997-98.
However, the subsequent California Supreme Court case noted that abortion was
specifically written into the contract. Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 96. The contract also
recognized, however, that "[a]ll parties understand that a pregnant woman has the
absolute right to abort or not abort any fetus she is carrying. Any promise to the contrary
is unenforceable." Id. at 96-97. Thus the court did not elect to address this issue. Id. at
97.
31. Such a scenario was addressed in a tort action where an intended father's sperm
arguably infected the surrogate mother with a disease that caused the child to be born with
hearing loss, mental retardation, and severe neuro-muscular disorders. Stiver v. Parker,
975 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1992). The intended father disclaimed responsibility, but the
court never ruled on the issue of parentage because it turned out that the child was
genetically related to the surrogate's husband. Id. at 269. The contract in that case
likewise sought to give the intended father control of the surrogate's abortion right,
allowing him to determine if the pregnancy should be terminated in the event of genetic or
congenital malformation. Id. at 265.
32. See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 97.
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unanticipated and unanswered problems.
Some states have adopted the logic of the Johnson court's test."
The California legislature has not done so, despite numerous pleas for
legislation from the lower courts.34
Without such legislation,
Johnson's limitations are evident. The intent-based test proposed in
Johnson35 does not factor in other rights that might be implicated if
one is willing to look carefully at the gestation period that is the
reality of all successful pregnancies. Because the intent test only
focuses on the pre-gestation period when initial intent is formed and
the post-gestation period after the child is born, it does not deal with
the decisional autonomy frequently addressed by the Supreme Court
in issues of privacy, procreation, and childrearing: 6 Indeed, the
dispute in the Johnson case occurred within this very important
gestational period,37 when the respective rights of the parties were
muted, overlapping, and in direct conflict.
B. Legislative Action: Florida's Regulation of Surrogacy Contracts
Other states have gone further than California to either explicitly
reject surrogacy agreements as void against public policy,38 or to allow
surrogacy contracts with limitations.39 For example, the Florida
legislature has taken an approach far different from the Johnson
33.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §168-B:1 (2000) ("'Intended parents'... means persons

who are married to each other, and who, complying with the requirements of this chapter,
enter into a surrogacy contract with a surrogate by which they are to become the parents
of the resulting child."). The Virginia statute is defined equally broadly to include
traditional surrogacy contracts: "'Intended parents' means a man and a woman, married to
each other, who enter into an agreement with a surrogate under the terms of which they
will be the parents of any child born to the surrogate through assisted conception
regardless of the genetic relationships between the intended parents, the surrogate, and
the child." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (Michie 2000).
34. See infra note 52; Anna J., 12 Cal. App. 4th at 998 ("We join our colleagues on the
trial bench who, in delivering this decision, underscored the urgent need for (legislative)
action. In particular, we hope the Legislature will tackle the difficult questions attendant
to surrogacy agreements so that both parents and children can face the future with
certainty over their legal status."). Note that the California Legislature has attempted to
legislate in the arena on several occassions, even prior to the Johnson case. S.B. 937, Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 1991-92) (vetoed by the Governor); S.B. 1160, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993-94) (failed
in the Senate); Assemb. B. 799 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001-02) (committee hearing cancelled at
request of author).
35. Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 93.
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
37. Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 88.
38. See supra note 2.
39. See supra note 3.
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court.' It specifically requires that in order to enter into a gestational
surrogacy contract, the "commissioning mother" 1 must be unable to
carry a child to term, face physical risk, or her pregnancy may cause
physical risk to the fetus. This reduces, at the outset, issues of
commodification that are often raised in connection with surrogacy
arrangements, because the number of situations in which gestation is
appropriate is pre-defined to eliminate surrogacy when more
traditional gestation is possible. Payments to a surrogate are limited,"
assumedly to prevent this commodification.
The statute attempts to define other elements of the surrogacy
contract as well. It specifically notes that the surrogate is "the sole
source of consent with respect to clinical intervention and
management of the pregnancy,'"' which eliminates concerns about
attempted coercion or contracting her abortion rights. Further, "the
commissioning couple agrees to accept custody of and to assume full
parental rights and responsibilities for the child immediately upon the
child's birth, regardless of any impairment of the child." 5 Such
language, sadly, has proven necessary by caselaw. In the 1992 case
Stiver v. Parker, a traditional surrogate gave birth to a child with
physical and mental defects due to contamination by the intended
father's sperm. ' The intended parents did not want to assume
custody of the child. 7 Although it turned out that the child was
actually the genetic son of the surrogate's husband,8 the situation
suggests it is not always the surrogate who changes her mind.
The Florida statute would solve the problem addressed in Stiver,
because the commissioning couple would have to parent the child
under any circumstances. Of course, this may raise concerns about
the "best interest of the child., 49 For the majority of cases, however,
40. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2000).
41. Id. at § 742.15(2).
42. Id. at § 742.15(2)(a)-(c).
43. Id. at § 742.15(4)("As part of the contract, the commissioning couple may agree to
pay only reasonable living, legal, medical, psychological, and psychiatric expenses of the
gestational surrogate that are directly related to prenatal, intrapartal, and postpartal
periods.").
44. Id. at § 742.15(3)(a).
45. Id. at § 742.15(3)(d).
46. 975 F.2d 261, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1992).
47. Id. at 269.
48. Id. at 263.
49. See, e.g., id. at 269. In Stiver, the court expressed concern about child abuse when
an intended parent refuses to take custody of a child due to "changed circumstances;" in
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the statute would clearly define the rights of the parties prior to the
impregnation of the surrogate, allowing intended parents to make
informed decisions before contracting for a surrogate's services:"
The Florida statute is a useful model, though it is not without
potential problems.

Unlike the Johnson court, the Florida statute

assumes the surrogate is the mother in the surrogacy contract, stating,
"[T]he gestational surrogate agrees to relinquish any parental rights
upon the child's birth."5' The possibility then arises that a court could
invalidate the agreement as a "baby selling contract" and a Baby M.

scenario could exist."

Even if a court did not determine that an

agreement terminating parental rights was void, it could raise

visitation and custody issues if the surrogate were to refuse to
surrender parental rights. 3 By refusing to define the surrogate as the

"mother," the Johnson court avoided another path that is potentially
equally problematic.
Nonetheless, the Florida statute is far preferable to none at all.
At very least, it can provide intending parents and potential
surrogates with general guidelines about how to pattern their
behavior and what outcome to anticipate. In so doing, it can avoid
many of the procreative, parental, contract, and property pitfalls that
this case due to the mental and physical disabilities of the child. Id. Conversely, concern
should also arise when an intended parent is forced to take custody of a child he or she
does not want.
50. Such an agreement might be attacked on the grounds that it will discourage
surrogacy. But that begs the question-why should surrogacy arrangements be
encouraged?
Even assuming surrogacy arrangements do not exploit women or
commodify children, as is often suggested, does this make them inherently good? See
MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 28 (1990).
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(3)(c) (West 2000). This situation could be complicated
when a gestational surrogate is implanted by an embryo not related to either member of
the "commissioning couple." "When at least one member of the commissioning couple is
the genetic parent of the child, the commissioning couple shall be presumed to be the
natural parents of the child." § 742.16(7). Nonetheless, the statute requires the surrogate
to terminate her parental rights. § 742.15(3)(c). Speculatively, a "natural parent" could
still lose under Michael H. analysis. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-130 (1989)
(holding that a natural father was not entitled to constitutional protection to his
relationship with his child, who was born as a result of an adulterous affair).
52. In this highly publicized case, a traditional surrogate changed her mind upon birth
of the child. In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 414-15 (1988). The court held that the exchange
of money for a surrogacy arrangement constituted baby selling and thus was void. See id.
at 421-422.
53. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (holding that "the Due Process
Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make
child rearing decisions" by forcing a mother to allow her children to have visitation with
their grandparents). Potentially, a surrogate mother could attempt to limit an intended
mother's visitation this way.
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loom behind the Johnson decision. The California Legislature would
be wise to take another look at Johnson and to consider the issues it
both addresses and fails to address. In so doing, it can strive to
fashion a statutory model that will respect the constitutional rights of
the parties and provide stability for the children that result from
modern reproductive technologies.
C. A Statutory Model: The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act

One comprehensive statutory model for surrogacy arrangements
is the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act. 4 The
act provides for two alternatives: under Alternative A, surrogacy
arrangements are allowed, but well-regulated. Under Alternative B,
surrogacy arrangements are void and the surrogate is the resulting
child's mother.5
Alternative A, which does not distinguish between traditional
and gestational surrogates, requires several prerequisites to protect
the surrogate, both by ensuring her mental and physical ability to
participate in the surrogacy process and by ensuring that the intended
parents are fully informed about the process. These prerequisites
include the following: the intended mother must be unable to bear a
child or to do so would cause unreasonable risk, a home study must
be performed on both the intended parents and the surrogate, the
surrogate must have had at least one prior pregnancy and delivery,
and all parties must have received counseling. 6 In addition to these
prerequisites, the surrogate can terminate the agreement within 180
days after the last insemination by filing a written notice with the
court." Finally, the statute specifically provides that a surrogacy
agreement "may not limit the right of the surrogate to make decisions
regarding her health care or that of the embryo or fetus."58
Thus, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act is probably the most comprehensive form of protection for a
gestational surrogate. It specifically protects her rights to control
medical care, and it implicitly allows her the opportunity to
54. 9B U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1994). Note that the Act has since been replaced by the
Uniform Parentage Act, which is significantly less protective. See Unif. Parentage Act, 9B
U.L.A. 287 (Supp. 2000).
55. 9B U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1994).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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reconsider her decision even after pregnancy.5 9 At the same time,
intended parents are protected: the requirement that the surrogate
has given birth previously not only suggests her physical ability to
bear a child, it also implies that she can anticipate the experience of
gestation and, at contract formation at least, that she believes she will
be capable of performing that function without assuming
motherhood. Although not perfect, the Act deals most realistically
with surrogacy contracts. Certainly it can and should be a model for
states attempting to formulate appropriate legislation.
II. The Surrogate's Individual Rights
When fashioning legislation, it is important that the bodily
integrity rights of the surrogate are appropriately acknowledged.
This will prevent attempts at coercive behavior in surrogacy
arrangements, as in a recent situation in California, where the
intended parents attempted to force a surrogate to have an abortion. 6"
Surrogacy contracts necessarily involve the surrogate's right to bodily
integrity. The concept is well founded in law: "No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by
61
clear and unquestionable authority of law.,
Gestational surrogacy contracts raise issues of fundamental
constitutional rights to privacy62 because the woman who intends to
parent the resulting child does not gestate the fetus. There are,
therefore, questions about what rights vest in the intended mother
and what rights vest in the gestator.63 Issues of controlling the
medical care of the surrogate, the health of the fetus, and the
termination rights of the surrogate are different than they would be if
the intended mother was also the gestator. While an intended mother
does have valid concerns about contract enforcement and her
parental rights, these concerns must not control the gestational
59. Notably, however, this decision must occur within the first six months of any
pregnancy; otherwise, the intended parents are considered the "parents." See id.
60. Eliza O'Driscoll, Parents: What's Yours is Mine: In California They are
Commonplace, but Here in Britain SurrogateMothers Make Us Queasy. So is it Time for a
Change in Attitude?, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 3, 2001, at 8.
61. Union Pacific v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
62. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (the right to procreate is "one
of the basic civil rights of man [sic]"), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 87 (1993).
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process.
A. The Right to Control of Medical Care

The right to control one's medical care is not a concept unique to
pregnancy. The issues may be somewhat different when pregnancy
becomes part of the discussion, however, because the potential life
engenders some degree of social concern. For example, we may feel
comfortable when we discuss a pregnant woman's right to make
decisions about life-threatening medical procedures; we may feel less
comfortable when we discuss her ingestion of substances that could
harm a fetus, such as heroin or cocaine. But in both cases, the rights
of the surrogate must be reaffirmed so as to prevent intended parents
from believing that by virtue of carrying a fetus for them, a surrogate
is surrendering her constitutional rights to make decisions about her
own body.'
Perhaps the seminal case in the area of bodily integrity is Cruzan
v. Missouri, a 1990 Supreme Court case that dealt with the right to
voluntarily cease life-sustaining medical care measures." Certainly,
the case only addressed the issue indirectly: Nancy Cruzan was
incapable of making her own medical decisions, and the case dealt
with family members making the decision for her.' Nonetheless,
Chief Justice Rehnquist dealt with the issue in terms of the
individual's right to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.67 He began
his analysis by looking to the common law, recognizing the wellestablished principle that the right to be free of interference is well
established in law.' The Court went on to state "The principle that a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions."'69 In strong language, Justice O'Connor concurred, stating:
Requiring a competent adult to endure such procedures against
her will burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to
64. As one scholar suggests, even attempts at "balancing" the interests of the fetus
with those of the gestator can be inappropriate, because "[any attempt at balancing
impairs a competent individual's right to decline treatment and, in an effort to protect an
unborn fetus, invades the autonomous decision-making of a living woman." Susan
Goldberg, Medical Choices During Pregnancy: Whose Decision Is It Anyway?, 41 RUTG.
L. REV. 591, 595 (1989).
65. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
66. Id. at 265.
67. Id. at 269.
68. Id. (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
69. Id. at 278.
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determine the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the
liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it
protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to
reject medical treatment ....
70
Thus, though not explicitly, the Court made it evident that the
right to control one's medical treatment is highly personal. This
rationale has been applied to pregnant women as well, even when
juxtaposed with the rights of the fetus and the state's interests in
protecting the fetus.7'

For example, in In re Baby Boy Doe, a

pregnant woman was informed that if she did not have an immediate
cesarean section, her child could be born dead or severely retarded.
Because of religious beliefs, the woman preferred to deliver naturally
and did not consent to the procedure. 73 The court reiterated her right
to make such a decision, stating, "Applied in the context of compelled
medical treatment of pregnant women ...a woman's right to refuse

invasive medical treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily74
integrity, and religious liberty, is not diminished during pregnancy.,
The court further stated, "A woman is under no duty to guarantee the
mental and physical health of her child at birth, and thus cannot be
compelled to do
or not do anything merely for the benefit of her
75
unborn child.,
This concept may be an uncomfortable one, but it is necessary.
A moral responsibility on the part of any woman-a mother or a
surrogate-does not create a legal obligation. If one is shocked by
the idea, it would be prudent to consider that parents are not required
to submit to surgery to assist their children in life-threatening
situations.76 As Susan Goldberg notes, "To carve out an exception for
pregnant women, an exception having nothing to do with decisional

70. Id. at 289.
71. See, e.g., In re Fetus Brown, 294 II1. App. 3d 159, 171 (1997) ("[ujnder the law of
this State ...we cannot impose a legal obligation upon a pregnant woman to consent to an
invasive medical procedure for the benefit of her viable fetus"); In re Baby Boy Doe, 260
111.
App. 3d 392, 392-93 (1994); Norwood Hospital v. Munoz, 409 Mass. 116, 130-31 (1991)
("[t]he State's interests in preserving the patient's life, in maintaining the ethical integrity
of the profession, and in protecting the well-being of the patient's child, did not override
the patient's right to refuse life-saving medical treatment"). This interpretation is not
unanimous, however. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Spalding, 247 Ga. 86 (1981).
72. Baby Boy Doe, 260 Ill.
App. 3d at 393.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 401.
75. Id.
76. See Goldberg,supra note 64, at 618.

Winter 20021

THE POWER OF PREGNANCY

competency, would relegate these women to a second class status."77
There is no reason to distinguish between mothers who give birth
naturally and surrogates who carry fetuses unrelated to them-both
implicate personal rights related to autonomous decision-making.
Thus, surrogates should not be compelled to undergo treatment
for the benefit of their fetuses, any more than mothers who give birth
naturally. Some cases have disallowed forced medical treatment of
criminal suspects and involuntarily committed mental patients."8
Since those within the state's custody are still entitled to make their
own medical decisions, suggesting that a competent pregnant woman
should be subject to outside control is incompatible "with our
heritage of civil liberties"-even if those decisions could affect
another woman's resulting child.79

The recognition of a gestator's right to make decisions about her
medical care raises the question of whether fetuses should be allowed
to recover damages at law when born with defects resulting from a
gestator's behavior or decisions about her medical care. Courts have
been somewhat inconsistent in treating a fetus as a person under the
law. In medical care decisions, as noted above, courts have often
treated fetuses as "part" of the women who are making decisions
about their bodily integrity.' On the other hand, when dealing with
third party tort claims, courts have often allowed fetal recovery."
There is an important distinction between a suit against a third
party and a suit against the gestator, however. In Stallman v.
Youngquist, the Court discussed the distinction between third party
tort claims and claims against the pregnant woman carrying the
fetus. 2 The Court there stated:
77. Id. at 620.
78. See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Right to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 615-17
(1986).
79. Id. at 617. This is not to say that courts have not tried to exercise such extensive
control over pregnant women. One district court even went so far as to order the court to
take "custody" of an unborn child when the county discovered that the mother was using
illegal drugs. See Wisconsin v. Angela M.W., 209 Wis. 2d 112, 118 (1997). The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reversed the decision but did not address the constitutional issues. See
id. at 121. Instead, it determined that the legislature had not intended fetuses to be
included in child abuse statutes. See id. at 137.
80. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
81. See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718 (1971); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519
S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629 (1939); Williams v.
Marion Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114 (1949).
82. 125 Ill. 2d 267, 276 (1988). Note that some courts have allowed fetuses to sue
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A legal right of a fetus to begin life with sound mind and body
assertable against a mother would make a pregnant woman the
guarantor of the mind and body of her child at birth. A legal

duty to guarantee the mental and physical health of another has
never before been recognized at law .... Mother and child
would be legal adversaries from the moment of conception until
birth. 83

The Court went on to state that allowing torts by fetuses against
their mothers would require a judicially defined standard for a
woman's acts and omissions during pregnancy.' On the other hand,
holding third parties responsible for torts against fetuses does not
affect a defendant's ability to control his or her own life, and is thus
distinguishable.85
their mothers. See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396 (1980) (allowing child to
sue mother for discolored teeth that resulted from mother's ingestion of tetracycline).
83. Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 267.
84. Id. at 277-78.
85. See id. at 278. One scholar has summarized the appropriate approach this way:
"The law should continue to recognize the existence of the fetus insofar as is
necessary to protect the interests of the subsequently born child and is consistent
with the pregnant woman's interests, as, for example, in suits by children against
third parties for prenatal injuries. In their attempt to protect pregnant women
from violent criminal or tortious acts, however, lawmakers should structure the
laws so that they retain their focus on the primary subject of protection-the
pregnant woman. Attempts to deter the destruction of fetuses by third parties
against the will of pregnant women should recognize that the actual physical
injury is inflicted on and suffered by the pregnant woman and that the fetus is
affected only through her."
Johnsen, supra note 78, at 611. Many courts have also been unwilling to treat fetuses as
people for purposes of child abuse statutes or other criminal laws attempting to penalize
mothers for harm to their fetuses. See, e.g., Johnson v. Florida, 602 So. 2d 1288 (1992)
(overturning a conviction of a mother for "delivering" heroin to two children, ostensibly
via their umbilical cords in the short time span after they were born but prior to the cords
being cut); Collins v. Texas, 890 S.W.2d 893 (1994) (court overturning conviction of
reckless injury to a child of a pregnant woman who ingested crack cocaine, stating that the
legislature would have addressed fetuses directly if intended them to be within the law's
applicability); State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156 (1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140,
1142 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1991) ("I conclude that the Legislature never intended for the
general drug delivery statute to authorize prosecutions of those mothers who take illegal
drugs close enough in time to childbirth that a doctor could testify that a tiny amount
passed from mother to child in the few seconds before the umbilical cord was cut"); Ohio
v. Gray, 62 Ohio St. 3d 514 (1992); Reyes v. San Bernadino County, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214
(1977); Reinesto v. Arizona, 182 Ariz. 190, 193 (1995) (finding that the Legislature would
have included fetuses in child abuse statutes if it had intended fetuses to be protected, and
finding that prosecuting unsuspecting parents under the child abuse statute would "offend
due process notions of fundamental fairness" because "[d]ue process requires 'that
criminal offenses be defined in terms sufficient to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute'); In re Pima County,
183 Ariz. 546, 548 (1995) ("we do not believe that the ... statute should be broadly
construed to include an unborn child"); Florida v, Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (1997) (holding
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Should the framework be any different with respect to a
surrogate? Is a surrogate comparable to a "mother" under this
framework, or to a third party? Although it does not appear that the
Stalman court wrote with surrogacy contracts in mind, the rationale
should extend to surrogates. Ideally, as with any gestator, one hopes
that the surrogate has the best interests of the child in mind-but as
with any gestator, moral responsibilities do not create a legal
obligation to act a certain way during pregnancy. And as would be
true for any gestator, defined standards of appropriate conduct are
unrealistic and infringe on the surrogate's right to control her own
life.86
B. The Right to Procreate
With recent developments in reproductive technology,
"[i]ntention about parenthood can now be expressed by means other
than preventing the birth of a child ....'or physically having one.
Surrogacy arrangements are an alternate method of expressing one's
intent to create. In Johnson v. Calvert, the Court specifically stated,
"A woman who enters into a gestational surrogacy arrangement is not
exercising her own right to make procreative choices; she is agreeing
to provide a necessary and profoundly important service.., without
any expectation that she will raise the resulting child as her own. ' In
this and similar statements, the Johnson Court did not distinguish
between the gestational process and parenthood. The Court focused
heavily on the importance of intent in defining rights. But the Court
failed to distinguish between procreative and parental intent-a
distinction that is vital to recognizing the rights of the surrogate. The
Calverts intended to utilize their procreative intent to enter into a
surrogacy contract, and to parent a child resulting from a surrogacy
teenage girl could not be charged with murder when she shot herself, thereby killing her
fetus). But see Whitner v. South Carolina, 328 S.C. 1, 4 (1997) ("[w]e do not see any
rational basis for finding a viable fetus is not a 'person' in the present context. Indeed, it
would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of homicide laws
and wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse"); In
re Ruiz, 27 Ohio. Misc. 2d 31, 34-35 (1986) ("The essence of Roe, the state's interest in the
potential human life at the time of viability, in conjunction with Ohio's developing case
law, compels a holding that a viable unborn fetus is to be considered a child ....
[A]t the
time of viability, the state has an interest in the 'child's' care, protection, and physical and
mental development").
86. Stallman, 125 Il.2d at 278 (1988).
87. Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood:An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297,309 (1990).
88. Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 100 (1993).
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contract. But it was Ms. Johnson who intended to be pregnant-and
thus during the period of pregnancy, it was Ms. Johnson whose
procreative rights were at issue.
On the other hand, a plausible argument can be made that
intended parents have a constitutional right to express their
procreative rights via a surrogacy contract, without limitation by the
surrogate.89 John Robertson suggests, "Restrictions on paying
surrogate fees and on enforcing surrogate contracts would infringe on
the procreative liberty of the couple providing the embryo ....

Such

an interference with procreative liberty requires a justification
beyond.., elevation of a particular morality of reproduction."' Such
a suggestion stems from the rationale that parties without the physical
ability to have children should have the same constitutional
protections as their counterparts who give birth naturally. 9'
But it is inappropriate to separate the procreative ability of a
gestational surrogate from her procreative intent. Surrogates, too,
are expressing an intent to procreate. And because our jurisprudence
regarding procreative rights has historically been closely linked to the
individual bearing the child, it is impossible to address procreative
rights without considering that the gestator and "mother" are not the
same person. The Johnson court failed to acknowledge that
procreative rights can be sub-divided into two categories: pro-creative
intent to parent that creates a surrogacy contract, and intent to use
one's body as a procreative tool. In failing to recognize that Anna
Johnson was using her body as a procreative tool, the court also failed
to grant her any constitutional protections normally associated with
procreation.
One example of procreative intent being separated from a
"normal" pregnancy is the 1992 case Davis v. Davis. 92 In Davis, the
Tennessee Supreme Court considered procreative rights in an in-vitro
fertilization case. 93 Mary Sue and Junior Davis had stored embryos
for future implantation, but did not sign an agreement about what to
do with the embryos in the event that they divorced or the intent of
one of the parties changed.94 When they did divorce, dispute arose
89. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction,59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942 (1986).

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1014.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
Id. at 598.
Id. at 591-592.
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about the disposition of the embryos.95 Mary Sue Davis sought to
donate them to a childless couple, while Junior Davis sought to have
them destroyed.96

Surprisingly, the trial court did not directly address the issue of
procreative rights. Instead, it determined that the embryos were
"human beings" at fertilization and awarded "custody" to Mary Sue
Davis.97 In reviewing the trial court's decision, the Tennessee
Supreme Court recognized "preembryos are not, strictly speaking,
either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human
life."98 In so recognizing, the court determined that the disposition of
the preembryos should be determined "by looking to the preferences
of the progenitors."" If their wishes were unascertainable, their prior
agreement should be carried out."°° And if no such agreement existed,
the interests of the parties in using the preembryos were to be
weighed.'0 '
Essentially, the disposition of the embryos was determined by
the procreative intent of the parties. The approach, therefore, is not
unlike the Johnson court's approach. However, the Davis court
allowed the present intent of the parties to govern, whereas the
Johnson court remained fixed on the status of the parties prior to
implantation. This fixation fails to account for reality. As the Davis
court recognized, "an 'adult' has a different legal status than does a
'child.' Likewise, 'child' means something other than 'fetus." 2 A
'fetus' differs from an 'embryo."" 3 In a gestational surrogacy
arrangement, the fact that the third party, the surrogate, becomes
involved changes the framework of procreative rights.
The
"embryo," with its almost property-like status,"°4 has been
95. Id. at 589-590.
96. Id. at 590. Originally, Mary Sue Davis wanted the embryos for transportation to
her own uterus, but after she remarried, her purpose changed. See id. at 589-590.
97. Id. at 589.
98. Id. at 597.
99. Id. at 604.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 592-93 (citing Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747, 779 n. 8 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
103. Id.
104. Some cases have treated embryos as property, subject to claims for conversion
and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon their destruction. See Del Zio v.
Presbyterian Hospital, 1978 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14450, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1978).
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transformed into the "fetus"-and thus enters the privacy framework,
where the privacy of the surrogate, not the intended parents, is at
issue.
Thus, in changing the legal status of an embryo to that of a fetus,
the intended parents have implicitly recognized the primacy of the
surrogate's procreational rights over their own. Their procreative
rights are not waived by the surrogacy contract, but are trumped by
the reality of a surrogate's pregnancy. The Johnson Court's rationale
in holding that the Calverts' procreative rights could not be infringed
on does not recognize the primacy of the surrogate's procreative
rights. The Davis court's rationale, on the other hand, suggests
looking to the current situation-which would include the realities of
a surrogacy arrangement and the presence of a new party.
As discussed above, the fallacy of the Johnson Court's denial of
Anna Johnson's procreative right is evident if one considers Ms.
Johnson's right to an abortion. The right to procreate also includes
the converse right not to procreate."5 If a right to procreate is vested
in the intended parents, as suggested by both Davis and Johnson,
would they have the right not to procreate? Arguably, should they
choose to terminate the pregnancy, if the right is theirs, they could
order the surrogate to do just that.
However, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the right
to privacy is an individual right."'° For example, in the context of
abortion, it is unconstitutional to require a woman to have the
consent of her spouse in order to have an abortion in the first
trimester of her pregnancy."° Such a requirement would violate a
woman's privacy right because "[t]he State cannot 'delegate to a
spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally
prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.'''°0
While the rigid trimester framework has been abolished when dealing
with abortion cases, a woman's right to an abortion prior to viability
Interestingly, in its jury instructions, the court never questioned the fact that the embryos
were property. Id. at *11.
105. See Judith F. Daar, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy
Process: Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J.L. &
MED. 455,461 (1999).
106. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.").
107. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
108. Id. at 69 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 329 F.
Supp. 1362, 1375 (E.D. Mo. 1975)).
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cannot involve an undue burden, and spousal notification, much less

consent, creates such a burden."
Courts have not yet been required to make the same findings in
relation to gestational surrogacy arrangements."" However, if the
Supreme Court is unwilling to allow a woman's husband to intervene
in a pregnancy where it cannot, it seems equally plausible that the
rationale would also be rejected when applied to unrelated third

parties like intended parents."'

The Calverts could not control

Johnson's individual right, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment,

over which even the government could not exercise control." 2
While the Johnson court found that recognizing Anna Johnson's
liberty interest in the companionship of the child would threaten the
procreative decisions of the Calverts, 3 it certainly cannot justify
treating Anna Johnson as if she had no procreative right. After all, if
gestation and motherhood need not be intertwined, as the Johnson

court recognized, then why must procreative and parental rights?
The Johnson court was willing to create a legal fiction to determine
Crispina Calvert was the "mother" in that case, yet remained
unwilling to address the fact that procreative rights did not belong to
the same person.
By entering into a surrogacy arrangement, parties should be
aware that the legal framework must be reworked to accommodate
the realities of the unique situation. Intended parents should not
expect to control procreative decisions. The question of "shifting"
procreative rights is clear if one considers a situation in which a
109. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-94 (1992).
110. In Johnson, the contract both purported to give the Calverts decision-making
authority and stated "All parties understand that a pregnant woman has the absolute right
to abort or not abort any fetus she is carrying." Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 96-97
(1993). The court decided it did not have to determine the validity of the provision that
attempted to give the intended parents the right to control the surrogate's abortion right.
See id.
111. Indeed, preventing a gestational surrogate from having an abortion is a form of
involuntary servitude, prohibited by the 13th Amendment, the California Constitution,
and the California Penal Code. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §1 ("[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction"); CAL. CONST. art. I §6 ("[i]nvoluntary servitude is prohibited except to
punish crime"); CAL. PEN. CODE § 181 (Deering 2000) (making the crime of involuntary
servitude punishable by two to four years imprisonment). On a purely logical level, "[i]t
would be most uncomfortable to allow the father in a surrogacy situation to obtain greater
rights by contract and by the payment of money than a husband has...." FIELD, supra
note 50, at 65.
112. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
113. Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 100.
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surrogate does not wish to terminate a pregnancy and the intended
parents do-as in the case previously described, when the child is
mentally or physically impaired. In such a situation, the intended
parents should be aware that by asking another person to bear their
child, they have surrendered the procreative rights that are so closely
tied to the individual.
III. The Contract Formation Period: Contract and Property
Considerations
A. Contract Rights
If the surrogate's procreative rights control gestation because the
intended parents' procreative rights terminate upon implantation and
their parental rights only begin at birth, then what rights do the
intended parents have during the gestational period? The logical
answer would be their contract rights. According to the Johnson
Court, that meant a contract for the "services" of Anna Johnson."4
Theoretically, the Calverts should therefore have been able to expect
some sort of remedy if Anna Johnson had failed to render those
services."5
Richard Epstein argues that surrogates should be free to contract
prior to implantation."6 Epstein suggests:
To argue that these contractual terms are inconsistent with the
autonomy of the surrogate mother is to miss the function of all
contractual arrangements over labor. Full control over their
own bodies and labor is what autonomous individuals have
before they contract. The process of contracting always
requires a surrender of some portion of autonomy, but only in
exchange for things that are thought to be more valuable." 7
Regardless of the possible issues of commodification, this fails to
account for the reality that gestation is not like other forms of labor."'
114. Id. at 96.
115. Theoretically, at least, Johnson could have fully performed her "services" and not
surrendered the child to the Calverts. It would be difficult to argue, in that case, that the
contract was solely for services. See generally, Christine L. Kenan, Surrogacy: A Last
Resort Alternative For Infertile Women or a Commodification of Women's Bodies and
Children?,12 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 153 (1997).
116. Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81
VA. L. REv. 2305, 2335 (1990).
117. Id.
118. For, "to portray surrogacy contracts as representing meaningful choice and
informed consent on the part of the contracting surrogate mother, rather than to see her as
driven by circumstances, also reveals an idealized perspective and a failure to take account
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Unlike an at-will employment situation, for example, requiring
specific performance of a surrogacy agreement would violate the
Constitution because it would result in involuntary servitude' 9-by
forcing a woman to carry a child to term, the court would be forcing a
performance of her "services."
Though courts have generally
rejected this argument, it is disingenuous for them to have it both
ways-to characterize a surrogacy contract as a contract for
"services," as the Johnson court did, and then to deny that forcing a
woman to complete a pregnancy is coerced labor.
Epstein does recognize the uniqueness of surrogacy, however:
precisely because surrogacy contracts are not contracts for
commodities, we need a legal regime where surrogacy contracts
will be enforced come hell or high water. Once the legal regime
is unmistakably clear, then any woman with doubts about her
psychological willingness to part with her child will steer away
from it. 12

Certainly the call for clear legislation is in keeping with the
proposal of this note. But locking a surrogate into a rigid framework
only at the formation of the contract is to ignore the social and
psychological realities of pregnancy in favor of convenient legal
constructs. As Judith F. Daar notes, "A woman's liberty interest in
reproductive decision making, although certainly imbued with
concerns about bodily integrity, also pays homage to the emotional,
psychological, familial, and spiritual ramifications surrounding the
decision to bear a child., 121 Ideally, a woman could negotiate at arm's
length about a fetus growing inside of her, 122 but caselaw suggests
otherwise. 123

of realities." FIELD, supra note 50, at 27. As the Davis court noted, "the parties' initial
'informed consent' to IVF procedures will often not be truly informed because of the near
impossibility of anticipating, emotionally and psychologically, all the turns that events may
take as the IVF process unfolds." Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
119. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §1; CAL. CONST. art. I §6; CAL. PEN.
CODE § 181 (Deering 2000).
120. Epstein, supra note 116, at 2339.
121. See Daar, supra note 105, at 461.
122. Not all scholars recognize this form of labor as any different from any other form,
however. For example, Eric Gordon suggests, "a pre-arranged surrogacy contract gives
the surrogate the opportunity to rationally consider the arrangement .... To argue that
her financial need does not give her a choice is to argue that any low income job is
similarly oppressive and should also be illegal." Eric Gordon, The Aftermath of Johnson
v. Calvert: Surrogacy Law Reflects a More Liberal View of Reproductive Technology, 6 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 191, 209 (1993). Failing to take account of the surrogate's constitutional
rights and the realities of pregnancy, such an analogy can be made. Realistically, it fails.
123. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396 (1987).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 29:

Majorie Schultz refines Epstein's argument. 124 She suggests:
[w]ithin the context of artificial reproductive techniques,
intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and
bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal
parenthood. As with most arenas in which private ordering is
encouraged, that rule ought not to be absolute. Rather, it
should be a default rule, an enabling rule that allows intention
to govern unless and until policy restrictions on particular types
of private
arrangements are articulated, justified, and
12
adopted. 1
From the perspective of determining parenthood, this analytical
framework makes good sense. It looks to initial intent, but does not
make it controlling. From the perspective of determining gestational
control (violation of the contract during purported performance),
policy restrictions are not needed because fundamental rights stand in
the way of any attempt to control by private ordering.
Schultz's argument suggests that the contract would be voidable
at the surrogate's option. If a contract is treated by a court as an
expression of intent, all of its terms would be valid unless legally
challenged. Parties could honor the contract if they so desired. But
when a court evaluates a surrogacy contract, it can look to evidence
of changed intent by the parties. Otherwise, parties can generally be
expected to abide by the terms of the agreement unless willing to
challenge them in court.
This is an approach that courts have taken when two parents
contract for the custody and control of their children.'26 Such
contracts are not binding on a court, even though not void or illegal.'27
Instead, courts use the best interests of the child to make child
2
custody determinations, regardless of any agreement by the parties."
Even in the tenuous embryo situation prior to implantation, and
before the Constitutional rights of bodily integrity become
implicated, courts have been willing to consider contracts for the

124. See Schultz, supra note 87, at 323.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., In re Arkle, 93 Cal. App. 404, 409 (1928); In re Guardianship of Joles,
No. 99-L-087, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2987, at *12 (11th App. Dist. June 30, 2000); In re
Guardianship of Van Loan, 142 Cal. 423,428 (1904).
127. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 130 Cal. App. 2d 186,193 (4th. Dist. 1955); Walker v.
Williams, 214 Miss. 34, 42 (1952). This is also true when a parent contracts with a third
party for custody. See, e.g., In re K.K.M., 647 S.W.2d 886, 890 (1983); In re Schwartzkopf,
149 Neb. 460, 467-68 (1948).
128. Stewart, 130 Cal. App. 2d at 193.
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purpose of establishing intent only.'29 This consideration seems even

more important in the gestational surrogacy arrangement, when
bodily integrity rights are implicated and "the clock is ticking. '
The same rationale should apply to surrogacy arrangements.
The Johnson case illustrates how poorly strict contractual
arrangements conform to the surrogacy process. By enforcing the
contract, the Johnson court refused to take into account evolving
realities: primarily, Anna Johnson's changed intent.
Scholars have criticized surrogacy contracts for this very
reason.13 1 As Mary Beth Whitehead, a traditional surrogate who
changed her mind about giving up the child, stated: "'I signed on an
egg. I didn't sign on a baby girl.... .

132

Our society assumes "that

the interests at stake lend themselves to deliberation, choice, and
commitment.' ' 33 When a true physical transformation ensues and a
child is born, one wonders if perspectives can change enough that
original "deliberation, choice, and commitment" change. Cases like
Stiver v. Parker suggest they change not just for the surrogate, but
also for the intended parents.'
Understanding contracts as expressions of intent may be a
difficult concept to fathom in law. After all, "[w]here contractual
ordering is accepted, the state neither requires people to make
binding commitments, nor bars them from doing so .... Persons who
believe that feelings about parenthood are too hard to predict need
not enter binding agreements."' 35 But very little about surrogacy law
suggests it operates to create normal bargaining relationships.
Applying contractual provisions strictly can conflict with issues of
bodily integrity by attempting to regulate future behavior based on
what happens in a pregnancy-as in a recent situation, when the
129. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
130. An example might be the attempt of the Calverts to control the abortion rights of
Anna Calvert, as mentioned previously. Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 96-97 (1993).
Although the Calverts never found the need to utilize this purported control, it was
inappropriate for them to even write it into their contract. Had it even been in dispute,
Anna Johnson could have faced the risk of losing her abortion right by the mere passage
of time.
131. FIELD, supra note 50, at 97.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Schultz, supra note 87, at 347.
134. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410 (4th Dist. 1998)
(intended father attempted to disclaim liability for a child implanted in a surrogate with
his consent); Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1992) (assumed intended father
attempted to disclaim responsibility for a child born with physical and mental defects).
135. Schultz, supra note 87, at 349.
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intended parents attempted to force the surrogate to have an abortion
because more than one fetus developed.136 Additionally, the issue of
damages if no specific performance occurs is certainly hard to
conceptualize, particularly if one rejects the notion of "baby selling"
and instead assumes surrogacy contracts are for "services." So while
failure to perform might logically lead to damages as they would be in
a contract action with a surrogate paying intended parents, "[w]hile
superficially plausible, this analysis offends our belief in the
'
uniqueness of each individual."137
Furthermore, treating contracts as expressions of intent will not
remedy the problem that occurs when intent transforms so that all
parties desire parental rights. In such a situation, litigation may be
inevitable. But if intent during gestation means anything, and a court
does not consider a contract as the final expression of the parties'
intent, then at very least it would be acknowledging the changing
attitudes of the parties. ' in a situation such as Stiver, where neither
party wanted the child, '39 the court could look to the contract as
evidence of the intent of the intended parents. Arguably this puts a
gestational surrogate at an advantage-if her intent changes and she
desires parental rights, her changed intent can be evaluated and she
might maintain a relationship with the child, whereas if the intended
parents' intent changes, they may still be faced with parental
responsibilities. But this once again goes to the uniqueness of the
gestational surrogacy arrangement-because her procreative rights
are at issue, the surrogate is entitled to protection, even at some cost
to the intended parents. Furthermore, this perspective simply helps
determine intent, and is not a hard and fast rule that makes the
contract enforceable. The presumption of intent would be weighed in
both cases.
Certainly recognizing expressions of intent could be accounted
for by statute-but not by general contract law. A statute such as the

136. See O'Driscoll, supra 60.
137. Schultz, supra note 87, at 360.
138. This would be more consistent with contract principles as well. See Malina
Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted
Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 497, 511 (1996). Looking to intent only "is
to determine legal motherhood according to a rigid contractual scheme that denies the
parties the protections provided by contract law ...[it] is thus inconsistent with contract
principles which permit an inquiry into gross unfairness in determining whether promises
must be kept." Id.
139. Stiver, 975 F.2d at 269.
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Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act '41 could give
adequate time for a gestational surrogate to re-express new intent. A
contract created prior to implantation generally would not because of
the difficulty in creating contractual terms to express intent that had
not yet developed. Evaluating surrogacy contracts this way "focuses
exclusively on intent without any analysis of procedural and
substantive fairness that allegations of gross unfairness usually
prompt.' ' 141 The only way to account for a surrogate's procreative
rights is by recognizing their primacy over the intended parents'
contract rights.
B. The Rights of Ownership

By utilizing the contract framework, one ought to consider the
possible consequences for breach of contract. Obviously, the Johnson
court only needed to address breach at the termination of Johnson's
services when she refused to surrender the child. But had Johnson
failed to perform by having an abortion, or by failing to terminate the
pregnancy when instructed to do so, the question of remedy might
have had serious significance.'42 Legislative silence in this arena leads
the ambiguity of surrogacy contracts into the dangerous area of
property law. After all, isn't destruction of another person's
"intended child" through exercise of one's own right to terminate a
pregnancy a property violation?
Were the legislature to address such an issue directly, property
law could be avoided.'43 But as it stands, the status of the human body
in relation to property is largely unresolved. As Radhika Rao has
observed:
[slometimes the body is characterized as property, sometimes it
is classified as quasi-property, and sometimes it is not conceived
as property at all, but rather as the subject of privacy rights...
the lack of coherence in our concept of the body promotes an
inconsistent and haphazard approach that enables different

140. 9B U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1994).
141. Coleman, supra note 138, at 510-11.
142. Another interesting scenario would occur if Johnson had terminated the
pregnancy because she was instructed to do so, and then the Calverts had refused to pay
her.
143. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West 2000). The Florida statute provides
that the surrogate has the sole source of consent with respect to management of her
pregnancy. At very least, this might suggest that the fetus does not "belong" to the
intended parents, and they would not be entitled to recover for any medical decisions with
which they disagree.
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treatment of the body under essentially similar circumstances.
Certainly the law cannot afford an "inconsistent and haphazard"
approach when considering the rights entangled in a surrogacy
arrangement, for surrogacy should logically lead to birth, and when a
new human being comes into the picture, courts must consider the
best interests of the child.
Rao makes appropriate connections between privacy and
property law; both carve out an area free from state interference,
encompass the right to exclude others from a protected space, and
preserve "a sphere of decentralized decision-making as a mechanism
to check excessive governmental power.' 415 But conversely, there are
significant differences between the two.1 46 For example, in terms of
the human body, property theory sees body parts as severable from
the person and distinguishable from individual identity.147 On the
other hand, privacy theory "forecloses such bodily fragmentation by
identifying the person with his or her physical presence ....
In
order to take all this into account, Rao proposes a logical solution:
"we should adopt the language of privacy rather than that of property
when we seek to protect self-ownership without suggesting that rights
in the human body can be conveyed to others .... ,141 So:
[a]lthough embryos themselves are not full-fledged persons,
they differ from other body parts because of their potential to
develop into a person. Accordingly, if individuals seek to enter
into or extricate themselves from personal relationships with
their frozen embryos as potential children, the course of action
implicates the right of privacy."0

Whose privacy rights are at stake in a surrogacy contract-the
gestational surrogate's in relation to her body, or the intended
parents in relation to their embryo? While Rao does not address this
directly, she explains that "autonomy consists of the right to resist

invasions of the body and open one's body to others in the context of
intimate and consensual relationships."'' 5 ' Because privacy law is
largely focused on the integrity of the human body, the interests at
144. Radhika Rao, Property,Privacy, and The Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 36364 (2000).
145. Id. at 418.
146. Id. at 429.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 436.
150. Id. at 458.
151. Id. at 438.
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stake must be those of the surrogate and her relation to the fetus.
Conversely, property rights would not be implicated. Certainly
cases have treated genetic material with "the capacity for life" as
property.'52 But appropriately, these cases have not involved genetic
material that has been utilized procreatively by implantation, and
thus have never approached the "second phase" of gestation. In York
v. Jones, the court determined that pre-zygotes held for future in-vitro
fertilization had been treated by the parties as property.' The court
regarded them as such, and thus determined that a clinic's holding of
such "property" created a bailment. 54
Once again, the important distinction in that case was that it
involved disposition of such property prior to implantation. As
recognized by Judith Daar, "[iun a sense, pregnancy was and remains
the gatekeeper for reproductive rights."' 5 And while reproductive
technology is changing that and recognizing the procreative and
parental rights of intended parents, this must be coupled with a strong
reaffirmation of the right of a woman to make essential decisions
about her pregnancy and the child she is carrying-regardless of
whether the child is "hers" or not, and recognizing that parental rights
in a child do not equate to property rights in a fetus.
IV. The Right to Parent
The right to control procreative decisions is separate from the
right to parent a resulting child. The California Supreme Court's
opinion in Johnson focused not just on the Calverts' procreative
rights, but also their parental rights.'56 The court's final determination
was that the Calverts were the "parents" of the "child." '57 At the time
litigation was filed, there was no child, and therefore it is hard to
understand how the court could determine that there were parents. "8
Logically, parental rights can only exist if a child exists. As a result,
the Calverts did not have any "parental" right to the "child" during
the gestation period in which the conflict arose.
Perhaps the point is moot. After all, a child certainly existed by
152. See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421,427 (E.D. Va. 1989).
153. Id. at 425.
154. Id.
155. Daar, supra note 105, at 458-59.
156. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 98 (1993).
157. Id. at 99-100 (referring to Crispina Calvert as "the mother," the Calverts as "the
parents," and the fetus not born at the commencement of litigation as "the child").
158. See id. at 88.
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the time this litigation was before the California Supreme Court. But
it fails to explain how the court could justify controlling Anna
Johnson's liberty interest-which, during pregnancy would mean the
autonomy to make decisions about her pregnancy-by the "parental"
rights the Johnsons did not possess at the time.
By utilizing the framework of parentage in their decision, the
Court implied that the Calverts controlled the entirety of the
process-it was their genetic material, they intended to have the
child, and they were the parents. The crucial step is the gestation
period in the middle-where the parental rights of the Calverts had
no significance. Considering the "second step" of gestation "affords
new flexibility in the allocation of rights and obligations between
procreating parties."'59 While not denying the rights of intended
parents, examining gestation as a phase separate from parenting looks
honestly at the Constitutional implications of such arrangements.
As evidenced by the cases that have followed Johnson, the
problem has proved just as ineffective in practice as it has in theory.
Several cases in California have proved that the lack of guidance in
the arena of surrogacy law has resulted in continued dispute. The
first case, In re Marriage of Moschetta, was decided shortly after
Johnson.'9 The Moschettas contracted for a traditional surrogacy
arrangement. 6 The surrogate had doubts about surrendering the
child when the Moschettas announced their intent to divorce during
her labor, but relented when they said they would stay together.63
Later, she changed her mind again.' 64 Since this situation involved a
traditional surrogacy arrangement, there was no "tie" 65
to break, and
the surrogate mother was determined to be the mother.'
In re Marriage of Buzzanca involved a gestational surrogacy
arrangement.' 66 The Buzzancas had a surrogate implanted with an
159. Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A
Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 188 (1986).
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160. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218 (4th Dist. 1994). Johnson
was decided between the trial and appellate levels of the Moschetta case. Id. at 1224.
While the parties originally agreed the surrogacy contract was unenforceable, thereafter
the Moschettas attempted to apply Johnson to show Cynthia Moschetta was the "mother."
Id.
161. Id. at 1221.
162. Id. at 1223.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1224.
166. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal App. 4th 1410, 1413 (4th Dist. 1998).
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embryo that was not genetically related to either the Buzzancas or the
surrogate. 67 When the couple divorced, Mr. Buzzanca attempted to
disclaim any responsibility for the child."6 Applying the Johnson test,
the court broke the "tie" in favor of Luanne Buzzanca, who did not
meet the statutory definition of "mother." 69 However, since her
intent resulted in the birth of the child, she was considered the
mother, and Mr. Buzzanca was the father and responsible for the
child. 7 °
Arguably, these cases were easily resolved under the intentbased analysis. Yet in each situation, had the California Legislature
taken the opportunity to speak on the issue, perhaps the parties
would not have had to subject more children to the arduous and
confusing process not only of litigation, but also of determining their
parentage. Notably, in each case, the court specifically asked for
further legislative guidance in the arena."'
A more recent situation exhibits the continued need for
legislative guidance in California. Helen Beasley entered into a
surrogacy contract with California couple Charles Wheeler and
Martha Berman.' For approximately twenty thousand dollars, Ms.
Beasley agreed to act as their gestational surrogate.'73 The contract
included the provision: "in the event of more than one child, the
surrogate agrees that any decision regarding
selective reduction shall
174
be the decision of the intended parents.'

167. Id. at 1412.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 1429. The court also made clear that her husband was the legal father.
Id. at 1418. They analogized this situation to artificial insemination: "If a husband who
consents to artificial insemination under Family Code section 7613 is 'treated in law' as the
father of the child by virtue of his consent, there is no reason the result should be any
different in the case of a married couple who consent to in vitro fertilization by unknown
donors and subsequent implantation into a woman who is, as a surrogate, willing to carry
the embryo to term...." Id.
171. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1235 (4th Dist. 1994) ("[o]nce
again the need for legislative guidance regarding the difficult problems arising from
surrogacy arrangements is apparent"); Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th at 1429 ("[t]he
Legislature can act to impose a broader order which, even though it might not be perfect
on a case-by-case basis, would bring some predictability to those who seek to make use of
artificial reproductive techniques").
172. Chris Taylor, with reporting by Helen Gibson, One Baby Too Many, TIME, Aug.
27, 2001 at 55.
173. Nightline: World News Now (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 29, 2001) (transcript
on file with LEXIS).
174. Id. "Selective reduction" is more commonly referred to as abortion.
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Helen Beasley became pregnant with twins.'75 Thirteen weeks
into her pregnancy, Wheeler and Berman sent her a plane ticket and
information about the "selective reduction" procedure that was
already scheduled. 76 A battle ensued, with Wheeler and Berman
unwilling to parent the two fetuses Beasley carried.'
Beasley's predicament made headlines in August 2001. The
situation suggests that intended parents are still acting
inappropriately by trying to control a surrogate's rights. Because
Beasley failed to comply with a coercive contract that attempted to
abrogate her constitutional rights, she faced the possibility of
becoming a "mother." Under California law, however, she would not
be recognized as one. Perhaps this ambiguity is the reason that a
majority of surrogate births last year took place in California;'78
intended parents who are seeking such arrangements know that the
law will favor them when they want to be parents, and yet may still
leave a surrogate unprotected when they decide they do not want to.
These cases reveal several important problems. First of all, as
previously recognized, the children born from contested surrogacy
arrangements suffer not only from the process of litigation, but from
the uncertainty of parenthood.'79 Thus, when these disputes arise,
courts must deal with the reality of a child and the changed status of
the parties. Parental rights are at issue-not in determining
procreative rights, as Johnson suggests, but because the court has no
choice but to address childhood.
Second, these cases also demonstrate that Johnson did not settle
the issue of parental rights as clearly as it purported to. Although the
Moschetta court easily dismissed the Johnson framework" ° and the
Buzzanca court easily embraced it, 8' the parties might have had a
better understanding of Johnson's meaning and their subsequent
rights had statutory guidance been available. Again, such guidance
might avoid some of the cost to the child, whose parentage was placed
in legal limbo.
Finally, these cases show that the psychological and physical
connection inherent in gestation make it hard to separate parental
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
O'Driscoll, supra note 60, at 8.
Andrews, supra note 8, at 2357.
See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218, 1224 (4th Dist. 1994).
See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal App. 1410, 1428-29 (4th Dist. 1998).
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rights in a gestational surrogacy arrangement, no matter how
"technically" inappropriate such connections may be. It is appealing
and easy to treat the intended parents as the parents, and thus to
assume that they control the entire course of events.'82 But by
recognizing the uniqueness of the gestational surrogacy arrangement,
one must acknowledge that this is not the case. Until a child is born,
the parties should be governed by the realities of the procreative
rights of the gestational surrogate, and not the potential parental
rights of the intended parents.
V. Conclusion
Gestational surrogacy contracts raise a multiplicity of issues:
commodification, equal protection, the best interests of the child-all
these are deeply embedded in any discussion about the
appropriateness of surrogacy arrangements, and are frequently
addressed by scholars and courts. All present appropriate and
important concerns, and sometimes, objections.
Such objections are valid. But since surrogacy arrangements do
and will exist, it is important to regulate them appropriately. The
most effective method of regulation would be legislative guidance
that could give contracting parties a sense of what to expect in
performance of surrogacy contracts. In forming statutes, legislatures
must consider the constitutional rights of gestational surrogates, and
the implication of those rights on the agreement between the
surrogate and the intended parents. The Johnson court noted, "any
constitutional interests Anna possesses in this situation are something
less than those of a mother." 18 In a sense, the court was correct.
Johnson did not have the constitutional interests of a mother-she
had the superiorconstitutional rights of a gestator.
If one is willing to consider the status of the parties at the time of
gestation, it is evident that individual autonomy, contract rights, and
parental rights overlap in a way that does not help delineate the
appropriate roles and behaviors of contracting parties. As a result,
important issues remain unsettled-what are the remedies for breach
182. The court in a traditional surrogacy arrangement rejected a claim of procreational
rights based on parental rights by an intended and genetic father on very similar grounds.
See In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 448 (1988). However, in that case, the court reasoned that
the parental argument for the surrogate was just as strong, since she was the genetic
mother and the surrogacy contract was considered void. See id. However, the argument is
just as strong even if the surrogate has no parental rights, because in a gestational
surrogacy arrangement, parenting does not control procreation.
183. Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 99 (1993).
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of the contract? What will happen if a child is born addicted to
drugs? Who will have responsibility for such a child if the interest of
the intended parties in parenting has dissipated during gestation?
Myriad questions remain unanswered, and many legislatures
remain silent. However, these problems will not go away. The
gestational surrogate's rights must be addressed if surrogacy contracts
are to account for the basic constitutional rights to which surrogates
are entitled.

